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Half an hour into the Maysles brothers’ Salesman (1968) bible-seller Paul Brennan is 
filmed sitting alone in a train carriage headed for Chicago. As he stares blankly out of 
the window Brennan’s face remains impassive, offering no indication of his emotions 
or state of mind, even while the image, in a slow zoom from medium shot to closeup, 
constitutes an implicit promise of access to some such manifestation of self. In order 
to overcome the resulting uncertainty of signification, and thereby anchor the 
meaning of the salesman’s face, the Maysles cut away three times to short inserts of 
Brennan’s colleagues boasting about anticipated earnings in an earlier scene. As a 
consequence, viewers are cued to infer Brennan’s anxiety and internalized pressure to 
perform, whether or not this is what he is actually feeling.1 I am interested in this 
sequence not for the ways in which it might fit into familiar debates about direct 
cinema’s interventions into, and mediations of, the profilmic event, but instead for its 
pertinence to a question that remains underresearched in scholarship on documentary: 
the delineation of human interiority, whereby the screened other is rendered an object 
of knowledge and source of affect for the audience. This essay examines a number of 
films to trace how they variously subscribe to, play with or confound the expectation 
of gaining access to their protagonists’ emotional and psychological depths. In the 
latter cases, audiences are faced with the limits of their understanding and confronted 
with the ultimate unknowability of the other.   
 Neither body nor voice offers a transparent registration of the inner life and 
feelings of the other. But manifold institutions and discursive practices (science, 
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medicine, the law, psychoanalysis, photography) have attempted to overcome this 
opacity and reticence in order to make body and voice intelligible and thus to produce 
the human subject as knowable. In the cinema, as Marian Keane has noted, ‘the 
medium of film – and specifically the camera – takes the nature of human interiority 
as its fundamental subject’.2 Keane is writing about fiction film, where scripted 
dialogue, actor performance and the codifications presented by mise en scene, 
framing, camera movement, editing patterns, lighting and music typically offer cues 
to characters’ states of mind and emotions. Yet not all of these resources may be 
readily available, nor deemed appropriate, across the heterogeneous terrain of 
nonfiction film (even if the explanatory voiceover, once challenged by the influence 
of direct cinema, is now widely used as a guide to the interiority of social subjects in 
television documentary and reality television.) Any confrontation with the ‘limits on 
the expressibility of human interiority’3 thus presents a particular hermeneutic 
dilemma for documentary, one that complicates its conventional epistemology, 
centred as it is on representing and making sense of the profilmic world. 
 I focus on documentaries that take interiority as a key problematic by staging 
inquiries into the possibility of, and constraints on, gaining access to the inner life of 
the other (rather than that of the author). This is not to imply that the other’s self 
should be thought of as a transcendental or ‘finished’ essence to be captured – quite 
the reverse.4 In their different ways, the films under discussion here attest to the 
necessity of attempting to learn about the screened other, but also to its final 
unknowability. This is an inescapable consequence of both the mobile, decentred 
nature of the human self and the mediation of such selves in audiovisual 
representations of bodies and voices. My argument begins with examples that pursue 
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traces of a subject assumed to be always already other than the audience: the blind 
person seen by the sighted, or the child viewed by adults. These largely observational 
films figure interiority as socially shaped and contingent, but also as commonly 
located within the single individuals represented.5 In these works by Sergei 
Dvortsevoy, Yi Seung-Jun, Nicholas Philibert and Jean Pierre Gorin, viewers are 
prompted to feel with and for those on screen but, crucially, are also kept at a distance 
from them in ways that foreground the partial nature of the knowledge on offer. I then 
turn to the role of the documentary interview by briefly considering two films by 
Errol Morris that investigate participants in controversial events from US history: the 
Vietnam War and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq. In these instances, as in 
many others, audiences are invited to scrutinize interviewees’ faces and voices for 
traces of inner depth, for dissimulation or revelation. In the process, Morris’s films 
attempt to close the distance between the screened other and viewers, who are 
promised hitherto ‘buried’ knowledge and emotional truth. The final party inquiry 
centres on an analysis of Carol Morley’s Dreams of a Life (2011), an assemblage of 
recollections and anecdotes about Joyce Vincent, a forty-year-old woman who lay 
dead and unclaimed in her London bedsit for three years. Vincent is constituted as a 
spectral offscreen presence, summoned up in interviews with former friends and 
approximated through a series of reenactments. Intended as a memorial to someone 
who can never be interviewed, the film can also be understood as a self-reflexive 0
study of the means by which documentary might lay claim to the absent other, and the 
ultimate restrictions on such a project.
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Any effort to find out about another’s situation and perspective despite structural 
differences must negotiate significant ethical and political challenges. The feminist 
political philosopher Iris Marion Young’s concept of ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’ is 
pertinent here, providing a paradigm that can be adapted and applied to viewing 
relations in documentary.6 Young ‘criticize[s] the idea that moral respect entails being 
able to adopt the standpoint of others’ and proposes instead the notion of 
‘understanding across difference’.7 She is writing about the politics of reciprocal 
communication, but her theory can inform a model of documentary spectatorship 0
founded on the notion of asymmetrical openness to the other.8 Here too, 
understanding can only proceed via the recognition of asymmetries and the attendant 
impossibility of attaining a complete understanding of the other. Young argues that
A condition of our communication is that we acknowledge the difference, [the] 
interval [separating us], that others drag behind them shadows and histories, 
scars and traces, that do not become present in our communication. Thus we 
each must be open to learning about the other’s perspective, since we cannot 
take the other person’s standpoint and imagine that perspective as our own. 
This implies that we have the moral humility to acknowledge that even though 
there may be much I do understand about the other person’s perspective […] 
there is also always a remainder, much that I do not understand about the other 
person’s experience and perspective.9 
Young is at pains to point out that this awareness does not necessitate an abandonment 
of attempts to listen across difference. Instead, ‘By learning from others how the 
world […] look[s] to them […] everyone can develop an enlarged understanding of 
that world […] that is unavailable to any of them from their own position alone’.10 
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The films under discussion here embody such attempts to learn (both cognitively and 
emotionally) about the other while signaling, either explicitly or implicitly, the 
constraints on this will to truth and the persistence of a ‘remainder’ in and of the other 
that exceeds any understanding.
 In the audiovisual medium of film, which presumes a sighted audience, 
sightlessness becomes a readymade signifier of alterity. When a blind person is 
subjected to the camera’s gaze, the remainder that exceeds understanding can appear 
almost insurmountable. This dilemma is also productive; the desire to cross so salient 
a barrier, to somehow share a sightless world, is mobilized as part of the appeal of two 
films I consider here. Yet the sighted audience inevitably stays outside, looking in on 
the experience of blindness and reliant on particular audiovisual codings of interiority 
to do so. Each film registers the lack of a shared perceptual perspective between 
audience and nonsighted subject, but also records the latter’s acts of mental and 
physical labour as subjective responses to the world, and as creative contributions to 
it.
 A spirit of asymmetrical openness informs Sergey Dvortsevoy’s In the Dark 
(2004), in which the distance between a sighted audience and the film’s subject, an 
elderly nonsighted man, is acknowledged in the first scene. While the old man feels 
on the bed for his mischievous cat (‘Bandit! Monster!’) the handheld camera slowly 
lifts up to catch sight of the pet perched, out of reach, on top of a wardrobe. The 
disparity in knowledge foregrounded here establishes the impossibility of simply 
adopting the standpoint of the nonsighted subject, while the film as a whole persists in 
an attempt to enlarge viewers’ understanding of his life. The ethical cost of such an 
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inquiry is nevertheless recognized by Dvortsevoy, who has since abandoned 
documentary for fiction film: 
The documentary film for me is essentially a terrible thing. I mean […] when 
one really wants to penetrate deeply into a person or situation. First you live 
with that person a long time, you interfere with their life, and then you 
recreate it and show to others […] it crushes me to interfere with a private life, 
since I can turn it into anything I feel like. I feel that it is dangerous for me, for 
my soul.11
Later the old man is shown in tears, after the string bags that he painstakingly weaves 
to give away on the street are repeatedly ignored or rejected by passers-by (figure 1). 
The impact of this denial of reciprocity, the refusal to acknowledge the old man’s 
creative efforts, is registered in a sustained closeup of his face as a legible signifier of 
dismay. This may produce tears of pity from audiences who, in the belated moment of 
viewing, cannot intervene to solve the problem. In the Dark offers no uplifting 
inspiration or easy moral solution, but at this moment it asserts the veracity of the 
human face as a straightforward, if rudimentary, index of interiority.12 Its meanings 
are dependent both on the bodily topography and movement that are captured in the 
shot and on its placement at the end of a sequence that moves from the domestic 
space of the old man’s flat to his exposure in the unpredictable setting of the street 
and back again.
 The profilmic response to the creations of the old man in Dvortsevoy’s film 
contrasts with the textual authority accorded the South Korean deaf-blind poet Cho 
Young-chan in Planet of Snail (Yi Seung-Jun, 2011). Young-chan’s reliance on touch, 
smell and taste places particular demands on a medium that cannot directly relay any 
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of these sensory stimuli but has to recode them in audiovisual terms. In early spring 
Young-chan and his wife Soon-ho climb a hill at the back of some apartment blocks 
and sit on a bench by a small group of pine trees. Young-chan hugs one of the trees 
and pats its rough bark, feeling and pressing it, inhaling its scent (figure 2). At this 
point the live sounds of other people’s voices and distant traffic are mixed down and 
replaced by quiet ambient music, as if gesturing towards Young-chan’s interiority, his 
own embodied knowledge and the sensory impacts of touch and smell. The 
soundtrack is crucial in this attempt to capture the materiality of Young-chan 
experiencing the tree, while the imagery recalls Laura Marks’s notion of haptic 
visuality, in which ‘vision itself can be tactile’.13 But Planet of Snail does not rely 
only on these sensory transpositions of the ‘“unrepresentable” senses’ of touch and 0
smell,14 it supplements them with onscreen reproductions of several of Young-chan’s 
poems, validating them as self-authored expressions of his interiority: ‘I am left in 
space alone. All deaf-blind people have the heart of an astronaut.’ Thus viewers are 
given the opportunity to draw on the work of both filmmaker and poet in order to 
approach the inner life of the latter. This does not eradicate difference, enabling 
sighted audiences to simply adopt the standpoint of Young-chan; instead it facilitates a 
degree of ‘understanding across difference’, inviting viewers to accept both the value 
and the limits of this engagement.
 A key trope for human interiority, the ‘sense of the self within […] understood 
to be the product of a personal history’,15 is the figure of the child. In Nicolas 
Philibert’s Etre et Avoir (2002), adult understandings of the experience of childhood 
are often mediated via M. Lopez, the experienced teacher in a tiny rural school in the 
Auvergne. Yet the film also gestures towards the restrictions on its own knowledge 
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about childhood interiority, and to a degree that of M. Lopez. This is particularly 
evident in the case of Nathalie, a very withdrawn girl who turned twelve in the year in 
which the film was shot. Philibert films M. Lopez talking to Nathalie’s mother about 
her reluctance to speak, and her difficulties with mathematics. Later, towards the end 
of the film, an uncomfortable scene shows the teacher asking Nathalie how she feels 
about leaving the village school to attend the local collège. He ultimately answers his 
own questions while Nathalie remains monosyllabic, anxiously scratching at her leg. 
The film never ‘improves’ on the frustrations and informational ‘inadequacies’ of this 
scene, nor does it ‘resolve’ the problem of Nathalie’s reticence through any ensuing 
revelatory sequences; instead it registers her inaccessibility. Visible but almost silent, 
seen but hardly known, Nathalie stays more or less beyond the reach of 
documentary’s epistemological warrant, the limits of which are foregrounded here.
 A similar strategy shapes Philibert’s representation of patients at La Borde 
psychiatric clinic as they rehearse a play by Gombrowicz in La Moindre des Choses 
(1997). A suspicion of illness or distress can sometimes be surmised from their gait, 
posture and dishevelled dress, and is often reiterated by their halting or oddly phrased 
speech. But beyond this, such bodies remain opaque. Aligned with both La Borde’s 
rejection of traditional hierarchy in psychiatry and the challenge to authority in 
Gombrowicz’s  Operetta, the film refuses to investigate and fix the patients as case 
histories or instances of pathology that can be ‘made known’ to the viewer.
 In Nénette (2010) Philibert again both recognizes and repudiates the desire for 
intersubjective relations, this time across a species barrier, when he captures sound 
recordings of the anthropomorphic fantasies and projections with which visitors 
attempt to domesticate and render recognizable the inscrutable figure of a forty-year-
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old orangutan in the Jardin des Plantes, Paris. He begins by filming Nénette’s eyes 
and face in extreme detail, figuring the desires of both zoo visitors and film audiences 
to penetrate her interiority. But the film crew, camera and microphone are gradually 
revealed to be, like the customers, separated from Nénette by a glass wall for their 
own safety – the institutional correlate of the marketable alterity of the wild animal. 
Philibert thus acknowledges and attempts to steer between the two contrasting bêtises 
in human–animal relations delineated by Jacques Derrida: anthropomorphic 
appropriations of the animal for human needs, and the suspension of compassion 
‘depriving the animal of every power of manifestation, of the desire to manifest to me 
anything at all, and even to manifest to me in some way its experience of my 
language’.16
 The enigma of the child and the complicity of documentary in institutional 
efforts to decode it is also confronted in Jean Pierre Gorin’s Poto and Cabengo 
(1980), which centres on adult attempts to interpret children’s voices. Like the body, 
the voice has been interpreted as an external cue to interiority, even though it too is 
less than transparent. Poto and Cabengo focuses on Grace and Ginnie Kennedy, six-
year-old twins whose shared private language (which includes sixteen different ways 
to pronounce ‘potato’) is investigated by linguists and thus comes to the attention of 
the US media. Experts conclude that the girls’ idioglossia is a ‘defective’ creolized 
language, combining English and German learned from their parents and 
grandmother. As Vivian Sobchack has noted, the twins’ ‘unstructured discourse 
challenges discursive authority; it erupts as a subversive act of authorship which has 
not been authorized by any social or ideological establishment’. 17 In a series of ironic 
‘informative’ titles which echo subtitled sound recordings of the twins made at a 
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children’s hospital, thus implicating his own documentary practice in the institutional 
drive to claim them as objects of knowledge, Gorin sends a series of question marks 
across the screen and announces in text the ‘verdict of science’ (figure 3). However, 
he also takes steps to distinguish his film from the disciplinary discourses of science 
and education. After a sequence showing the girls’ separation and entry into different 
schools, where each is belatedly learning ‘correct’ English and being ‘properly’ 
socialized, a sound recording run over the closing credits plunges the listener back 
into the disorienting flow of the twins’ untranslated language. The move stages an 
impossible return to a non-compliant and ‘dysfunctional’ phase of their development, 
and so offers a fantasy of a childhood free from the normative regimes of language 
and society. This is, of course, a familiar construction of an unregulated childhood as 
a lost, irretrievable and almost presocial idyll that exceeds the retrospectively inclined 
gaze of adult understanding. But it also serves as an acknowledgement of Young’s 
‘remainder’, of the final unknowability of the other, whether adult or child.  
 Like the childhood voices of Ginnie and Gracie, the screened body may also 
find ways to evade regimes of truth, through what Bill Nichols has called ‘its excess 
of physical specificity and historical situatedness’.18 Elizabeth Grosz notes that the 
body has long been ‘colonized through the discursive practices of the natural 
sciences’.19 These, along with dominant western philosophical traditions, promise that 
its corporeality can be ‘reduced to a predictable, knowable transparency’.20 The body 
is plumbed for hidden depths, scrutinized, mapped and classified in order to gain 
truths of the person ‘inside’ it. In the epistemology of documentary, bodies and the 
people inhabiting them are conventionally claimed as objects of inquiry (and of play 
in more heterodox forms).21 But while it is repeatedly constituted as a knowable 
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object through a battery of discursive operations, the body’s multiple meanings are 
never exhausted by these procedures. In Grosz’s terms, bodies have the capacity to 
‘seep beyond their domains of control’.22
 A note on terminology is required here. Metaphors of exteriority and 
interiority, surface and depth, are prevalent but somewhat reductive figurations of the 
complex interfaces between body and mind. Grosz augments these with an alternative 
paradigm, that of the Möbius strip, which she argues is better suited to developing an 
understanding of ‘embodied subjectivity’ and ‘psychical corporeality’:23 
The Möbius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into 
body and body into mind […] [it] also provides a way of problematizing and 
rethinking the relations between the inside and the outside of the subject […] 
the uncontrollable drift of the inside into the outside and the outside into the 
inside.24  
While drawing on Grosz’s work, I also retain notions of surface and depth in order to 
further interrogate the assumed relations between the two. One such connection is 
found in what I call the surface-depth hermeneutic, whereby a bodily or facial surface 
is presented as a legible cue to the inner depths of the person on screen (as in the case 
of In the Dark). This linkage may be complicated for dramatic or rhetorical effect; or 
it may be cued only to be refuted, as in the final sequence from Dreams of a Life, 
which I examine in detail below. 
 In dominant contemporary western cultures at least, the face is always a text to 
be deciphered, considered the most salient sign of individuality, ‘the very locus of 
subjectivity’ as Mary Ann Doane puts it.25 Perhaps more than any other image in 
cinema, the closeup of the human face is a surface that conventionally implies 
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intimate access to, and knowledge of, the ‘truth’ of the human subject. Yet the 
materiality of the face can also exceed or refuse intelligibility through its opacity and 
what Siegfried Kracauer called its ‘puzzling indeterminacy’.26 Jacques Aumont points 
to the double significance of the face as ‘both sensible and legible at the same time’,27 
and to its ‘hesitation between two poles, that of appearances, of the visible […] and 
that of interiority, of the invisible or of the beyond-the visible’.28 As Doane notes:
Almost all theories of the face come to terms in some way with this opposition 
between surface and depth, exteriority and interiority. There is always 
something beyond […] It is barely possible to see a close-up of a face without 
asking: what is he/she thinking, feeling, suffering? What is happening beyond 
what I can see?29
Thus the reliability of the face as a visible index of interiority, character, thought and 
emotion cannot be taken for granted but is always open to question. The possibility of 
dissimulation, or simply inscrutability, persists.30 The conventional surface-depth 
hermeneutic, deployed throughout fiction film from romantic comedy to melodrama 
to horror, exploits and manages this problem in several, often interrelated, ways. 
 First, the face may be produced as a straightforwardly legible signifier of 
interiority, a manifestation or analogue of what lies beneath. Thus traditional 
physiognomy couples beauty with virtue and ugliness with vice. Second, exteriority 
(often in concert with the voice) can be used to mislead characters and audiences, 
playing on their trust in a predictable relationship between the visible and the 
invisible. In Iron Man 3 (Shane Black, 2013), for instance, Ben Kingsley’s character 
the Mandarin is coded as an evil Islamic terrorist, wearing a beard, topknot and 
permanent frown, but is ultimately revealed to be a harmless English actor in the pay 
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of the real (Caucasian) villain. Third, an inexpressive or inscrutable face can pose a 
question about the intentions, feelings or reliability of a character, in that the surface 
points to the existence of depths but clarification is delayed or withheld. Thus in 
Pablo Larrain’s Post Mortem (2010), Mario (Alfredo Castro) is underplayed 
throughout so that in the final scene his motives in imprisoning and thereby 
condemning to death the female neighbour who has been the object of his lust remain 
ambiguous. He could be read as any one or more of the following: a jealous 
psychopath; complicit with the violence of the new Pinochet regime; a more reluctant 
figure, finally acquiescing to the imperative of self-preservation and the collapse of 
‘neighbourly’ mutuality in a society traumatized by the coup against Allende.
 The logic of the surface-depth hermeneutic is often harnessed to a hierarchy of 
knowledge, whereby the viewer is granted access to character information that is 
withheld from others in the diegesis. A striking instance occurs towards the end of 
Antonioni’s L’Eclisse (1962) as Piero (Alain Delon) embraces Vittoria (Monica Vitti). 
While her back is to the camera, he looks over her shoulder and almost into the 
camera, thus puncturing the self-sufficiency of the romantic couple. Piero’s gaze, 
unseen by Vittoria, grants the audience an intimation of the impossibility of their 
romance, one reiterated seconds later when both characters continue the embrace with 
their faces turned away. This premonition of failure is confirmed at the end of the film 
when neither Piero nor Vittoria appears at their arranged rendezvous.  
 In the above cases, the face variously provides, misrepresents or withholds a 
suggestion of character emotion, personal history, realization or intention that may 
later be confirmed by narrative events. So how might a surface-depth hermeneutic 
function in documentary? The documentary interview, with its implicit promise of 
13
exposure or self-revelation, is the most obvious site for audiences to be cued to search 
for traces of emotional depth and to seek evidence of veracity or dishonesty in the 
details of the face.31 Morris frequently invites viewer examination of his subjects by 
filming them in closeup and medium closeup from a number of angles, using his 
Megatron system. This technique 
 allows the speaker to face the camera, the viewer, and the interviewer at the 
same time. The Interrotron, an apparatus designed especially for this purpose, 
is ‘essentially a series of modified teleprompters […] [which] bounces a live 
image of Morris onto a glass plate in front of the interviewee; the interviewee 
respond[s] to an image of Morris that floats directly in line with the camera’.32 
When twenty or more cameras are used in this system, Morris calls it a Megatron.
 Morris’s The Fog of War (2003) is structured around a single interviewee, 
former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (figure 4). The use of the 
Megatron here implicitly promises a penetration beyond surfaces. John Corner 
borrows the term ‘critical physiognomy’ to consider how the film invites particular 
scrutiny of McNamara’s face for traces of interiority and emotional or psychological 
truth:
The politics of Fog [sic] are to a degree carried in the face of McNamara, a 
face regularly seen in close-up, the camera registering its movements of 
expression, its shifts of mood, what it might suggest about an ‘inner’ 
McNamara, the microphone picking up the hesitations and the tonal shifts.33  
In a sequence from a lengthy discussion of the Vietnam War, Morris mobilizes a 
combination of interview footage, musical score and archival material to query 
McNamara’s self-presentation. A key element here is the sustained attention paid to 
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McNamara’s face and bodily comportment, which, it is implied, may belie his verbal 
assertions. A closeup frames McNamara’s bespectacled head on the left of the screen, 
while Morris’s voice is heard from offscreen space, asking: ‘To what extent did you 
feel that you were the author of stuff, or that you were an instrument of things outside 
of your control?’ McNamara replies, ‘Well, I don’t think I felt either, er, I just felt that 
I was serving at the request of a President who had been elected by the American 
people and it was my responsibility to help him, er, to carry out the office as he 
believed was in the interests of our people.’ Watching and listening to this response, 
viewers may engage in critical physiognomy, asking to what extent any unease is 
registered corporeally as McNamara shifts in his chair and touches his forehead and 
then his chin, ending his answer with his fist pressed against his mouth. Mournful 
music plays as Morris cuts to archive footage of McNamara’s apparently enthusiastic 
participation in news conferences about the war (pointing at maps and photographs, 
even holding up an automatic rifle), then riding in an amphibious personnel carrier, 
and watching with President Johnson as jets take off from an aircraft carrier. The 
sequence prompts viewers to read McNamara’s body as a facade that tries to screen 
his inner feelings but fails to do so. Morris’s selection of archive material effectively 
undercuts McNamara’s bland, technocratic terminology, encouraging audiences to 
derive inferences of discomfort and even guilt that McNamara explicitly disavows. 
Recalling Grosz’s Möbius strip, the interview may thus be read as an instance of ‘the 
inflection of mind into body […] the uncontrollable drift of the inside into the 
outside’.34
 In Morris’s Standard Operating Procedure (2008), the US military police 
personnel who were imprisoned for prisoner abuses in Abu Ghraib are interviewed 
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using the Megatron and screened for viewers who have probably already formed 
conclusions about them from the intense media coverage of the scandal. The film 
offers these so-called ‘bad apples’ an opportunity to tell their own stories, and gives 
audiences the chance to examine them for traces of honesty or falsehood. Julia Lesage 
comments: 
As I watch them in close-up talking to the camera, these former guards and 
interrogators seem sympathetic, yet I know of their terrible acts. As they 
speak, I search their faces for signs of remorse and any indication that they are 
lying or telling the truth.35 
But the interviewees remain somewhat opaque. Angry, defensive or inscrutable, they 
never appear surprised or led into inadvertently exposing hidden depths, presumably 
because they have rehearsed their statements many times in legal proceedings and 
previous media interviews. While the film takes time to attend to these viewpoints, 
the surface-depth hermeneutic fails to supplement them with any additional 
revelations. Through its relative failure, Standard Operating Procedure throws into 
relief the expectations and viewing strategies of the conventional documentary 
interview. 
  
  In contrast with Morris’s work, Carol Morley’s films The Alcohol Years (2000) and 
Dreams of a Life displace the scrutiny of interviewees as protagonists onto an absent 
subject, who is accessible primarily via the stories told about them by others in 
interview. These in turn may reveal something about the witnesses (confused, 
grieving, smug, angry, curious) as well as the person being recalled. In The Alcohol 
Years Morley’s object of inquiry is herself. She collates twenty-seven interviews in 
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which former friends and associates recall her promiscuous and drunken behaviour 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one on the fringes of the Manchester music 
scene in the mid 1980s. This results in an othering of the self: a collage from which 
only a decentred, incomplete notion of Morley as subject can be derived. Largely 
invisible behind the camera and barely heard on the soundtrack, she becomes ‘a 
composite of other people’s ideas’.36 Dispersed across various anecdotes and 
produced as ‘knowable’ only fitfully through them, she is always mediated by the 
workings of memory, friendship, animosity and desire. ‘Carol Morley’ is thus left to 
be constituted by the viewer, who is confronted with the task of triangulating between 
interviewees’ accounts, occasional reenactments, very brief archive footage, 
photographs and contemporary Manchester street scenes. Morley’s interiority and 
motivation remain irretrievable, but the film incites speculation about them on the part  
of both audience and interviewees, most explicitly when some suggest connections 
between her promiscuity and her father’s suicide.
 Canonical narrative forms in documentary demand of their human subjects the 
‘performance of a lifetime: the condensation of a lifetime into representative 
moments’.37 In orthodox biographical documentary, the notion of a more or less 
coherent, centred, knowable person is constructed via the procedures of interview, 
observational footage, archive selection, and voiceover narration, which 
conventionally ascribe meaning and significance to the subject’s life. But Morley’s 
films interrogate these assumptions and expose the limitations of screen 
(auto)biography.38 The absent body and the person it housed can only be approached 
indirectly via mediations that can never fully capture the desired ‘essence’ of the 
person. The ‘truths’ of Carol Morley and Dreams of a Life’s Joyce Vincent can only 
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be sought, and never fully found, in the partial, provisional traces and recounted 
memories recorded by camera and microphone. Who was Joyce Vincent? How did 
she die? Why was her body left to rot in a bedsit for three years? Dreams of a Life 
hinges on an unresolved tension between the urge to know the truth of Joyce’s 
interiority and an acknowledgement of the impossibility of fulfilling this desire – not 
just in the particular instance of Joyce, but for documentary as a mode of relating to 
and representing the world. Over the course of the film Joyce emerges (if at all) as a 
disunified, contradictory and shifting subject. She is described by one former 
boyfriend as ‘a chameleon, no great drives, no great plans. She wasn’t a person with a 
past and she certainly wasn’t a person with a future’; another says that ‘when she 
went out with someone, she sort of became part of that person’. The film proceeds as 
an inquiry into Joyce’s case, in which both its making and watching are presented as 
necessary steps in the pursuit of the unsolved mystery. But it can only offer a 
fabrication of Joyce, an assemblage produced from an aggregation of memories, 
desires, fantasies and regrets.
 Dreams of a Life is thus structured as a particular kind of puzzle film or 
mystery. While displacing the investigative function from the onscreen protagonist to 
the unseen narrational authority of the film, it constitutes a documentary version of 
that popular fiction genre the detective story, described by Brian McHale as the 
‘epistemological genre par excellence’.39 Morley’s burgeoning collection of 
photographs, maps and post-it notes, in addition to a timeline tracing Joyce’s various 
addresses, friends and lovers, recall the evidence boards and inquiry rooms of 
television police procedurals.40 Yet despite collating numerous (at times 
contradictory) recollections, impressions, projections and fantasies about ‘who Joyce 
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was’, the film ultimately suggests that her life confounds and exceeds all attempts to 
render it knowable. Dreams of a Life both solicits viewer engagement in a search for 
truth and confronts audiences with the inevitable inadequacy of the ‘evidence’ and the 
failure of any such quest. 
 The cause of Joyce’s death remains unknown, due to the decomposed state of 
her corpse. Insofar as she can be read as a victim of atrophied social bonds, insecure 
‘flexible’ lifestyles and the anonymity of urban living, she becomes a figure of the 
precariousness of identity in the ‘liquid modernity’ of the present historical moment.41 
This symptomatic reading is proffered in interviews with a reporter who covered her 
inquest and with her local MP. However, quite apart from any such sociological 
significance, Joyce also stands as an uncanny, fantasmatic figure, elusive and spectral, 
a lost object who remains beyond retrieval despite the desire of the former friends and 
acquaintances interviewed in the film, and of viewers, to catch hold of her. In the 0
process, some of the interviewees are themselves subjected to the logic of the surface-
depth hermeneutic. The most notable is Martin Lister, who dated Joyce for some time, 
was perhaps her closest friend, and is described by Morley as ‘the hero of the film’.42 
With a highly expressive face, he appears open and self-deprecating, sometimes 
puzzled but never defensive. However, intimations of a deeper sadness can be 
detected in the nervous laugh with which he responds to a sound recording of Joyce’s 
voice. Morley’s arrangement of Martin’s interview material conforms to the surface-
depth hermeneutic insofar as the aggregation of short clips scattered through Dreams 
of a Life enables viewers to gradually build a sense of getting to ‘know’ him. The final 
and most revealing footage of Martin is kept until four minutes from the end of the 
film. Shot as usual in closeup, he starts talking while looking offscreen, then offers a 
19
nervous smile. "I wish she'd rung me, ’cos’ I would have helped, ’cos I love you.’ He 
suddenly breaks down, crying quietly with his head in his hands. Martin’s use of 
direct address and the slippage into the present tense attest to his continuing emotional 
attachment to Joyce. Grosz’s ‘inflection of mind into body’ is clearly evident here. 
Face and voice are shaped by, and function as legible indices of, interiority. But it is 
precisely this kind of revelatory dynamic that the film queries in relation to Joyce 
herself.
 Until the very last image of the film, Dreams of a Life offers very few 
indexical registrations of Joyce’s image (just a handful of still photographs of her with 
friends or family) although at points it does replay her voice, captured in a song and 
some short tests for a recording studio. Uncannily emanating from an absent body, 
this record of her voice emphasizes the paucity of any visual traces of Joyce. Into this 
evidential void the film inserts a series of reenactments, in which a child plays young 
Joyce at home and school, and actress Zawe Ashton plays the adult Joyce at work, at 
home, and in the anonymity of taxis and urban street scenes. 
 Bill Nichols has written of the complex fantasies and gratifications entwined 
in documentary reenactments:
unlike the contemporaneous representation of an event […] the reenactment 
forfeits its indexical bond to the original event. It draws its fantasmatic power 
from this very fact. The shift of levels engenders an  impossible task for the 
reenactment: to retrieve a lost object in its original form even as the very act of 
retrieval generates a new object and a new pleasure.43 
In the case of Ashton’s performance as Joyce, the impossibility of retrieval is 
registered indirectly by the blankness and ambiguity of many of the reenacted scenes. 
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Deliberately quotidian and frequently lacking in significant revelatory or 
transformative moments, they depict Joyce returning home with bags of shopping, 
confronting dirty washingup in the sink, singing along to soul records, watching 
television, putting on makeup, riding in taxis. This accumulation of detail hints at an 
undertow of loneliness and anxiety, which becomes more overt in two particular 
sequences. In one, a series of tense tracking shots shows Ashton/Joyce walking 
around the outside of a housing complex, as if seeking someone or something that is 
never revealed. The other – the longest reenactment in the film – shows her alone in 
her flat, singing along to Carolyn Crawford’s ‘My Smile is Just a Frown Turned 
Upside Down’. The scene codes her as unhappy, but does little to resolve the question 
of cause.
 In these scenes Ashton’s body becomes, in Nichols’s phrase, ‘a body too 
many’, unable to match that which it represents.44 Not only does the film present 
viewers with Ashton as a stand-in for Joyce. That other body, once living and now 
dead, to which the actress’s body refers, remains almost entirely absent from the 
screen, inaccessible both at the film's production (the registration of interviews and 
reenactments) and its reception. It is not until the film’s final sequence that audiences 
are offered the disclosure of long-withheld video footage of the adult Joyce. Nelson 
Mandela is shown in closeup talking into a loudhailer, presumably backstage at the 
1990 tribute concert held at Wembley Stadium, London, which an interviewee has 
already recalled Joyce attending. The film cuts to a longshot, filmed from the back of 
a room or marquee packed with perhaps forty people. The clip is slowed down as a 
digital zoom moves towards a woman emerging from the crush of bodies on screen 
left. She is clapping, smiling, and turns away from the direction of Mandela until she 
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is more or less facing the camera. The camera closes in until her face fills the screen, 
hair pulled back, a single pale earring glowing against the shadows that surround it 
(figure 5). The image is held in a freeze frame for twenty-two seconds, as a piano and 
the wordless harmonies of gospel singers are heard on the soundtrack. 
 In its anonymous, instrumental recording of the crowd, the (analogue) video 
footage recalls what Colin MacCabe, following Bazin, terms the ‘indifferent 
automatism’ of cinema as machine, ‘its automatic reproduction of a reality it cannot 
intervene to change and its indifference to the audience before which it is projected’.45 
But the arrangement and reshaping of this material within Dreams of a Life 
foregrounds the intervention of a narrational authority purposefully addressing an 
audience. This address is manifested in the placement of the archive clip as the final, 
climactic sequence of the film, and in the further ‘enhancements’ of digital zoom, 
freeze frame and nondiegetic music that combine to announce the moment as 
significant.
 Whatever their expectations at the start of the film, audiences will sooner or 
later come to view it as an inquiry into the identity and history of the unclaimed body. 
Thus, at some point they are liable to cross what David Trotter has called the 
‘hermeneutic threshold’.46 This is ‘the point at which interpretation commences’ and a 
film shifts from captured contingency and materiality (‘sense’ in Trotter’s term) to a 
system predicated on meaning and prioritizing intelligibility.47 What the final clip in 
Dreams of a Life does is to both intensify this hermeneutic invitation and to 
interrogate it. Just at the moment that interpretation is emphatically cued in this 
sequence, it is disrupted and blocked.
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 In signaling so overtly its address to an audience, here Dreams of a Life both 
acknowledges and repudiates the desire for a revelatory image that subtends 
documentary as mode of film practice and viewing strategy. Conventionally the 
moving image is produced as a source of knowledge about the other, a means of 
encapsulating a truth of the person figured. The fetishized closeup of Joyce’s face 
mimics this; it is framed and presented for scrutiny but is semiotically insufficient. 
This is not just due to the degraded picture quality of the frozen video image, but also 
because, in its opacity, this particular face can never sustain the weight of 
accumulated projections, recollections, fantasies and speculations that it has been 
asked to bear. The spectacularized set of exteriorities – eyes, skin, hair – say nothing 
about Joyce’s interiority or about her situation. The image – once random and 
contingent, an anonymous fragment in the crowd, now privileged by being suspended 
in time and reframed in space – still cannot solve the mystery of Joyce. It only attests 
to the demand for resolution. No depths can be inferred from this surface. Joyce’s face 
stilled, held and enlarged is no more revelatory of her interiority than it would be 
when passing in a blur. It can neither confirm nor contradict any of the interpretive 
investments with which it is now freighted.
 In an essay on Naturalism in literature and film, Trotter notes its ‘willingness 
to become absorbed in the absence of meaning and value’, in contrast to the art of 
observation championed by movements such as the picturesque, ‘which requires that 
the world yield an implicit meaning and a value, if not necessarily for those who 
inhabit it, then for those who observe them inhabiting it’.48 Dreams of a Life traces 
some attempts to recuperate Joyce’s death (if not her interiority) by rendering her case 
as emblematic of social breakdown and the anonymity of contemporary urban life. 
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But the film refrains from fully endorsing this interpretation. Instead it ultimately 
yields the story of Joyce to ineradicable ambiguity, and leaves its quest for meaning 
unresolved. Joyce’s interiority remains indecipherable, and so too does her symbolic 
significance. Yet her case is not quite abandoned to formlessness and squalor. If not 
redeemed as valuable through their final meaning, Joyce’s life and death nevertheless 
become catalysts for the regret, bafflement and unease of those who once knew her, 
and perhaps for similar responses among those watching the film. This is as far as 
Dreams of a Life can go in extracting ‘meaning and value out of existence’,49 and in 
fulfilling Morley’s tentative claim to offer ‘a memorial and legacy of sorts’.50 Far 
from resolving the inquiry into Joyce’s interiority, the final sequence of Dreams of a 
Life emphasizes the asymptotic relation of the film to its object of investigation, 0
approaching but never arriving at its impossible destination. 
 
While the documentaries considered here deploy divergent strategies, they all engage 
with the hermeneutic problem of how to make interiority knowable, and the 
constraints on this project. From observationalism (Philibert, Dvortsevoy), to 
interview-based pieces (Morris, Morley) these films approach, interrogate and at 
times play with the stubborn opacity, reticence and inaccessibility of the other. 
Moreover, films such as Dreams of a Life, Poto and Cabengo, and Planet of Snail 
make an ethical demand on their audiences, presenting them with both the existence 
and the impossibility of their desire for the pleasures of knowledge and affect that 
documentary traditionally mobilizes. In doing so they remind viewers how Young’s 
inevitable ‘interval’ structures all encounters between self and other. Whether figured 
as an onscreen presence or recalled as an offscreen one, the other may be invoked, 
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recorded and displayed, but is never fully captured. By extension, screen documentary  
as a regime of knowledge must, in its pursuit of the human subject, continue to 
confront its epistemological limits, the provisional nature of its hermeneutics, and the 
remainder which escapes its understanding. In this sense rather than obtaining the 0
truth of a person, it too might offer only dreams of a life.
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